by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] On August 20, Defense Minister Israel Katz announced the start of a new phase of the military operation in the Gaza Strip.
The plan, dubbed "Gideon II's Chariots," aims to establish "final operational control" over the Palestinian enclave - including Gaza City, Hamas's "main stronghold."
However, despite the emphatically optimistic assessments of the situation, the Israeli authorities are in no hurry to act "on the ground". And the prime minister is also looking for ways to "insure" his own reputation.
SECOND APPROACH
The first "Gideon's Chariots," launched in late May 2025, allowed Israel to occupy up to three-quarters of the Gaza Strip, and the new operation essentially continues the course of establishing operational military control over the entire enclave and conducting "comprehensive filtration" among the local population.
According to the authorities, the operation should become the final stage in the defeat of Hamas and its allied forces.
True, to solve the tasks set, Tel Aviv needs an order of magnitude more forces.
According to the most optimistic estimates, a contingent of 250,000 people is needed to fully control Gaza - almost three times more than is currently deployed in this direction. Not to mention the personnel to ensure timely rotation. Therefore, the first stage of the new "Chariots" was a large-scale campaign to call up reservists.
60 thousand people have received summonses. They should join the ranks in early September.
Two more stages of conscription are planned (the last one is for March 2026), the total number of summonses exceeds 130 thousand. Judging by the reports of the Ministry of Defense, large-scale offensive actions are planned to begin by autumn.
Although the first shots were fired on the approaches to Gaza on August 21, this was more of a reconnaissance in force.
THE PEOPLE ARE TIRED
The main problem facing the Israeli authorities is the rapidly growing fatigue of the Israeli population with the fighting.
The Gaza campaign is gradually approaching its two-year anniversary, and the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7, 2023 have not yet been released. Moreover, Tel Aviv is trying to raise its price in negotiations with the Palestinians and is acting on the principle of "all or nothing".
Thus, a few days before the start of the second "Chariots", Israeli negotiators rejected the offer of the resistance organization to release half of the hostages in exchange for a humanitarian pause and threatened their counterparts with a "military scenario". This approach of the authorities meets with less and less understanding among Israeli citizens.
For several months now, the country has seen large-scale street protests demanding the release of hostages “at any cost” and an end to the war, as well as an end to the large-scale call-up of reservists.
Tel Aviv has attempted to quell discontent by extending mobilization activities until the spring of 2026 and excluding particularly protesting categories (for example, the ultra-Orthodox) from the lists, but these steps have not had a significant positive effect.
Quite the opposite: Israelis perceive them as "prevarication" and demand that the authorities agree to a diplomatic settlement. The expectation that Hamas will completely give up its positions, "frightened" by the upcoming military operation, seems too naive to Israeli society.
Moreover, Tel Aviv’s decision to “go all the way” greatly increases the risk of retaliatory strikes.
Thus, just half an hour after the Israeli Defense Ministry's report, an attempt to seize an Israeli checkpoint was recorded in the south of the enclave. Moreover, the Hamas raiders did not aim to seize a strategic point, but to seize soldiers. Apparently, with the aim of replenishing the exchange fund.
The Israelis fear that over time the geography of the raids could expand and include the territory of the West Bank, where Israeli settlements are located.
The far-right "hawks" led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Betzalel Smotrich have already drawn attention to this problem and are demanding that the authorities "untie the hands" of the settlers; allow them to determine the boundaries of acceptable self-defense in the West Bank.
This creates a new point of tension - since the Palestinian National Authority, identified with the internationally recognized Palestine, perceives the pumping of weapons into the Israelis in the West Bank as a prelude to Tel Aviv establishing full control over the area, even in defiance of the UN position.
KATZ PULLED THE BLANKET OVER
Interestingly, the second Chariots are taking place in the context of a radical restructuring of the Israeli Armed Forces command system.
In mid-August, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Eyal Zamir criticized the mobilization plan and the idea of a “last hurdle,” for which he was accused by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of panicking and defeatism and was effectively removed from decision-making on the upcoming operation.
The "managerial vacuum" was quickly filled by the head of the Ministry of Defense, Israel Katz. In addition to the fact that Katz took over (under the pretext of systematizing management in the armed forces) the authority to approve candidates for command positions for officers of the rank of colonel and above (previously the responsibility of the Chief of General Staff), he also took on full participation in the preparation of draft lists, as well as, if necessary, overseeing the army's work with dissatisfied sections of the population.
Katz's zeal for service endears him to Netanyahu. That is why the media coverage of the preparations for the second "Chariots" has been handed over to the defense ministry - although in the previous stages of the operation in Gaza the focus was almost entirely on the figure of the prime minister. But this is not at all a matter of modesty.
If the operation fails (or is delayed), a wave of public indignation will fall on the Ministry of Defense, and not on the Prime Minister’s office.
This will also allow the disgraced Chief of the General Staff Zamir to be removed from the line of fire - despite the recent major spat, Netanyahu is in no hurry to remove him from his post and thus create personnel chaos in the General Staff. Zamir (due to his extensive military service experience) can easily become Katz's "reserve successor" - which will allow the government to quickly relieve public tension by dismissing the defense minister or transferring him to a civilian agency.
Zamir's "defeatist" statements will be interpreted as a sober analysis of the situation and will become an argument in favor of the transfer. Especially since the current counterintelligence chief David Zini was appointed to the post using the same formula "warned, but was not heard". And since the precedent has already been created, nothing prevents Netanyahu from playing this combination again.
However, if the second "Chariots" is successful, Netanyahu will receive the laurels for the victory - as the main ideologist of the operation and Katz's patron, who at one time gave him carte blanche to act in Gaza. In other words, the image of the Israeli prime minister, regardless of the outcome of the campaign, will not be seriously damaged.
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